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Abstract
This paper examines a puzzling inconsistency between the theoretical prediction of
private provisions to public goods and actual fundraising behavior. While fundraisers often
choose to announce past contributions, economic theory predicts that contributions will be
largest when donors are uninformed of the contributions made by others. This paper
suggests that an announcement strategy may be optimal because it helps reveal the charity’s
quality. It is shown that when there is imperfect information about the value of the public
good and contributors can purchase information regarding its quality, then there exist
equilibria in which an announcement strategy is optimal. Interestingly, in equilibrium a
high-quality charity receives contributions that exceed those that would result had the
quality of the charity been common knowledge. Hence, an announcement strategy not only
helps worthwhile organizations reveal their type, but it also helps the fundraiser reduce the
free-rider problem.
   2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The literature on charitable giving typically assumes that the fundraising game
is exogenously determined, thereby ignoring the possibility that fundraisers may
1 be able to design fundraising drives to maximize their objective functions. If we
are to understand charitable giving, then we must recognize the alternative
strategies available to the fundraiser and better account for the role of the
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1See for example Andreoni (1988, 1990, 1995), Bergstrom et al. (1986), Cornes and Sandler (1984).
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2 fundraiser in the contribution game. Most of the literature on voluntary contribu-
tions assumes that donations are given simultaneously, yet the characteristics of
many fundraisers suggest that the underlying game is a sequential game. For
example, in practice, fundraisers often use a sequential solicitation strategy and
announce contributions that are given during a fund drive. In addition, capital
campaigns are typically launched by the announcement of a large ‘leadership’
donation, and new contributors and their pledged amounts are made public
throughout the campaign. Also, recurring fundraising campaigns often inform
contributors of previous donations made in the local community or at the latest
3 charity event.
This paper investigates the role of the fundraiser in the contribution game and
examines why and when a fundraiser has an incentive to announce contributions.
Current theory on private provision of public goods suggests that an announcement
strategy is suboptimal. Varian (1994) shows that private contributions will be
largest when contributors are uninformed of the donations made by others.
However, this result relies on the assumption that the ﬁrst contributor can commit
to giving only once. When this assumption is relaxed it can be shown that the
contribution levels with and without an announcement are identical. That is, a
fundraiser will achieve no additional gain by announcing previous contributions.
Why then do many fundraisers appear to be far from indifferent between
announcing and not announcing past contributions? The hypothesis of this paper is
that an announcement strategy succeeds because it helps reveal otherwise
unknown information about the quality of the public good. Indeed the paper
demonstrates that when there is imperfect information, then there exist equilibria
where charities, independent of quality, choose to announce past contributions, and
high-quality charities strictly prefer this action. The reason is that the initial
contributor acquires costly information about the charity’s quality, and the
fundraiser is able to credibly make this information common knowledge by
announcing the level of the ﬁrst contribution. Hence, for high-quality charities,
announcements generate contributions that exceed those that arise when past
contributions are not announced.
Of particular interest is that by announcing contributions high-quality charities
can secure a provision level which exceeds the level that would result had the
charity’s quality been common knowledge. An announcement strategy not only
helps high-quality projects to be recognized as being worthwhile, but it also
enables them to reduce the traditional free-rider problem of private provision of
public goods.
2Examples of previous research on fundraising are Rose-Ackerman (1982), Steinberg (1985, 1986,
1991), Weisbrod (1988), Bilodeau and Slivinski (1996, 1997, 1998), Andreoni (1998), Slivinski and
Steinberg (1998), and Romano and Yildirim (2001).
3Edles (1993) recommends that fundraisers inform future contributors of the number of donors and
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The next section of the paper provides a brief review of the work that motivates
the present paper. The third section describes the model and examines the
equilibria that arise. The last section concludes the paper.
2. Literature review
Varian (1994) examines a model in which two individuals make sequential or
simultaneous donations to a public good. He shows that if donations are
announced and the ﬁrst contributor can commit to a one-time contribution, then
the ﬁrst contributor can effectively free ride on the second contributor by
committing to a low initial donation. The implication of this result is that relative
to a no-announcement fundraising strategy, less of the public good is provided
when the ﬁrst contribution is announced.
This result indicating the suboptimality of announcement strategies relies on the
strong assumption that the ﬁrst contributor can commit to giving only once.
Clearly, the ﬁrst contributor prefers a scenario in which she is prevented from
contributing more than once; however, if given the option she will increase her
contribution in the second round of the game. Unfortunately, it is difﬁcult to
imagine the mechanism that would give such commitment power to the ﬁrst
contributor. Assuming that the fundraiser’s objective is to maximize the sum of the
contributions, it is doubtful that the fundraiser would refuse an additional donation
from the ﬁrst contributor.
Suppose instead that the ﬁrst contributor is unable to commit to her ﬁrst
donation. That is, following her initial donation, the ﬁrst contributor can make an
4 additional donation to the public good simultaneously with the second contributor.
The equilibrium contribution of this game is identical to the level that results when
5 the ﬁrst contribution is not announced and contributions are made simultaneously.
Hence, the contributed amount is independent of the announcement strategy, and
there is no reason why the fundraiser should prefer to announce past contributions.
This prediction not only runs counter to common practices of the fundraising
industry, but it is also inconsistent with one of the few empirical studies in this
area. Silverman et al. (1984) examine data from a national telethon in which three
different funding schemes were employed. They ﬁnd that announcing the names of
individuals pledging money and the amount of money pledged resulted in greater
4There are many ways in which this game can be played in practice. Imagine for example that the
fundraiser calls up the ﬁrst contributor and asks for her contribution. Then the fundraiser calls all the
other contributors, tells them what the ﬁrst contribution was and asks them to contribute anonymously
to the public good. In addition to asking for donations, the fundraiser also informs each donor that once
all the donors have been called, the fundraiser will call the ﬁrst contributor again to ask her if she
wishes to increase her initial donation. Bilodeau and Slivinski (1998) also examine a sequential
contribution game and show that the entrepreneur is unable to commit to a one-time contribution.
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6 contributions than when they were not announced. In other words, verbal
information about what other people are doing is sufﬁcient to increase contribu-
tions.
One explanation for why contributors make larger donations when their
contributions are announced might be that the announcement gives contributors
7 prestige or the ability to signal their wealth. That is, the announcement effectively
adds a private beneﬁt to the donation, thereby increasing its marginal beneﬁt.
While these social factors may play a role, they do not sufﬁciently explain why
contributions are announced during a fund drive. In particular, if announcements
are made simply to generate an internal beneﬁt to the contributor, then the
donations might as well be announced after the fund drive is over. Furthermore,
this explanation is not consistent with the fact that charities ask the contributor for
permission to announce the contribution. Donors who want to make a contribution
anonymously are often encouraged by the fundraiser to make the contribution
publicly. For instance, the chairman of the trustees of Johns Hopkins explains that
the reason that the university asks donors for permission to announce their gifts is
that ‘‘fundamentally we are all followers. If I can get somebody to be the leader,
8 others will follow. I can leverage that gift many times over.’’ Therefore, an
announcement will not only increase the donation of the leader, but in addition it is
likely to have a positive effect on future contributions of others.
One reason why donations should be announced is provided by Andreoni
(1998). He shows that if there is a ﬁxed cost associated with provision of a public
good, then there may be multiple equilibria of the provision game. In particular
there will be an equilibrium where the public good fails to be provided and one
6The average amount contributed per hour was $771 during local time with announcements, $412
with local talent without announcements, and $312 with national talent and no announcements. One
should evaluate these results, however, with a bit a caution. The 20 hour telethon was separated into
15-min intervals and total contributions were calculated for each interval. To the extent possible the
telethon alternated between the three different treatments every 15 min. However there are many
deviations from this rule. The strongest evidence in support of announcing pledges may be that during
the last 3 hours of the telethon more time was spent reading pledges because it was clear by then
‘‘ . . . that reading pledges increased them’’ (p. 308). The results do support announcements even when
this latter period is not included in the data. The authors do not rule out that some contributors may
simply have played a timing game, however they also argue that viewers may be less likely to watch
television during the pledge readings.
7Andreoni (1988, 1990), Harbaugh (1998), Glazer and Konrad (1996), Olson (1965), and Steinberg
(1989).
8The New York Times, 2 February 1997, p. 10. This article points out that there are two aspects to
being an anonymous donor. While some prefer that neither their gift nor identity be announced, others
don’t mind that their donation be listed but prefer that they are listed as anonymous givers. The model
that we develop in this paper requires that both of these facts are known. If the ﬁrst contribution is to
serve as a signal of the charity’s type then the size of the donation as well as the identity of the donor
must be known. To keep the model simple we assume, however, that the identity of the contributor is
known, and limit ourselves to analyzing whether the donation should be announced in a model of
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where it is provided. He demonstrates that the fundraiser by coordinating
leadership contributions can guarantee a positive-provision outcome. In such a
scenario the fundraiser strictly prefers to announce the leadership contributions.
An alternative explanation is provided by Romano and Yildirim (2001). They
show that contributors may give more in a sequential game if the ﬁrst contributor
can commit to a one-time contribution and the second mover’s best-response
9 function is increasing in the contribution of the leader.
Contrary to the approach taken in this paper, both of these models assume that
the ﬁrst contributor can commit to a one-time contribution, however Andreoni’s
result is not sensitive to this assumption, and Romano and Yildirim’s result holds
in the no-commitment case when all contributors have positively sloped best-
response functions. Both of these explanations can be seen as complementary to
the explanation presented here.
3. Fundraising when information is imperfect
As proposed in the introduction, we argue that fundraisers may choose to
announce past contributions because this announcement helps them reveal the
10 value of the public good that they provide. In the model examined here, it is
therefore assumed that the contributors have imperfect information about the
quality of the charity.
Considering that currently there are more than 600 000 charities and another
30 000 joining their ranks every year, it seems plausible that contributors do not
have perfect information about the quality of the organizations. While contributors
may be informed about the quality of some organizations, charities continually
introduce ‘new products’ and it may be difﬁcult prior to the provision of a speciﬁc
public good to evaluate how useful that good will be.
Although the standard assumption in the voluntary contribution literature has
been one of perfect information, there are a few exceptions. Rose-Ackerman
(1980, 1981) and Handy (1995) argue that for most agents the quality of charities
is uncertain, and suggest that the presence of government grants, united funds or
prominent individuals, will help resolve the informational problem. Schiff (1990)
9An individual’s contribution may be increasing in that of others if he is sufﬁciently concerned about
the private beneﬁt that he derives from his own contribution.
10The idea examined here is related to that of Hermalin (1998). He examines a team production
problem in which one team member, the leader, is exogenously informed about the marginal return to
effort. The leader commits to an effort level, and this level serves as a signal of the marginal return to
effort. Hermalin shows that this sequence of moves increases the overall effort level. The primary
difference from the private provision of public goods problem is that there is no crowding out in the
team production model. This negative correlation has important consequences if one is to extend
Hermalin’s model to a public goods model. Indeed if the leader can commit to a one-time contribution,
then it is often the case that the charity strictly prefers not to announce past contributions.632 L. Vesterlund / Journal of Public Economics 87 (2003) 627–657
suggests that the informational problem may be resolved when potential con-
tributors choose to volunteer for an organization. Similarly to Schiff we argue that
the quality of the charity can be revealed after some sort of costly inspection by
11 the contributors. That is, rather than assuming that one contributor is informed
we endogenize the contributor’s information-acquisition decision. While charities
certainly try to convince contributors of their merits, it is reasonable to assume that
12 truthful information is costly. Indeed some contributors spend substantial
resources investigating the quality of the proposed project and may even set up
foundations which employ a whole team of experts to evaluate and investigate
13 proposed projects.
In summary the model that we propose extends the standard model of private
provision of public goods in four directions. First, the value of the provided public
good is uncertain; second, contributors can buy information about the true value of
the public good; third, the fundraiser is viewed as an actual player in the game;
and fourth, contributors cannot commit to one-time contributions.
3.1. Model
Although it is of interest to explain why fundraisers continue to announce
contributions, this paper focuses solely on why fundraisers choose to announce the
ﬁrst contribution. The following section describes the model and the underlying
assumptions.
The fundraiser is working either for a high-type charity, H, or for a low-type
charity, L. A high-type charity provides a beneﬁcial public good, while a low-type
charity provides a useless public good. Let x denote j’s private consumption and j
let G denote the public good. Assume that each individual has income m, and
0.5 0.5 individual preferences of the form x 1v G , where v denotes the value of the ji i
14 public good i. When the charity is of high type it provides a public good where
11In contrast to Schiff’s approach we incorporate the fact that contributors have an incentive to
convince others that a charity is of high quality.
12At the very least contributors have to spend time determining the charity’s quality. In contrast
Hermalin (1998) does not model this choice and assumes that the leader always is given a signal prior
to exerting effort but only after the contracts have been ﬁxed. The followers in Hermalin’s model are
always uninformed.
13In an interview with John Stossel, Ted Turner stated that ‘‘Giving a lot of money away is almost as
difﬁcult and complicated as making it. You have to hire people to do it. They’ve got to analyze things
real carefully.’’
14It will soon become clear that it is difﬁcult to solve the model when preferences do not have a
speciﬁc functional form. However, it is easily shown that similar equilibria arise when preferences are
aa of the form U 5x 1v G , where a [(0, 1). We suspect that the same will hold for utility functions jj i
of the form U 5f(x )1v h(G), where both f() and h() are monotonically increasing and concave. In jj i
Section 3.5 we describe in more detail how preferences may affect the class of equilibria, and we also
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15 v 51, and when it is of low type it provides a public good where v 50. H L
The charity’s type is known to the fundraiser, who, conditional on type, chooses
either to announce the ﬁrst contribution, z 51, or not to announce the ﬁrst i
contribution, z 50, where i 5H, L. The fundraiser’s goal is to choose z such that i i
it maximizes the total contribution G . Assume that the price of the public good is i
one, and that it takes one unit of the private good to provide one unit of the public
good.
Contrary to the fundraiser, the potential donors do not know the charity’s type.
Each donor’s prior is that a charity has an equal probability of being a high-type or
a low-type charity. Conditional on whether an announcement is made, contributors
form beliefs m(Huz) about the charity’s type.
Assume that there are two identical contributors, j 5 A, B, and that contributor
16 A is the ﬁrst to make a donation. We ﬁrst characterize the equilibria when only A
can buy information about the charity. Later in Section 3.5 we examine the case
where both contributors can purchase information, and we show that this
assumption does not alter the equilibrium predictions.
By paying a cost, c, contributor A will receive a perfectly informative signal,
s [hL, Hj, indicating the charity’s type. Let I (z)[h0, 1j denote A’s decision to A
purchase information when the fundraiser uses fundraising strategy z, such that
I (z)51 when she buys information. This implies that A can be one of three A
different types. Denote an uninformed A as type t 5u, an informed contributor A
who receives a high signal as type h, and an informed contributor who receives a
low signal as type l. While the cost of information is common knowledge, A’s
purchasing decision and the signal are known only to A. Thus A’s type, t ,i sn o t A
common knowledge.
The structure of the game is the following. First, nature reveals to the fundraiser
which type of charity it is representing. Contingent on its type, the fundraiser
decides whether to announce or not to announce the ﬁrst contribution. This
decision is common knowledge. Prior to donating, contributor A has the option of
buying information about the public good. If a no-announcement action is chosen
by the fundraiser, the two contributors effectively make simultaneous donations to
the public good.
In the case where the ﬁrst contribution is announced, contributor A ﬁrst decides
0 whether to buy information and then makes an initial contribution of g (z 51, t ) AA
to the public good, where the ‘0’ superscript denotes that the contribution is made
15The primary conclusions of this paper are not driven by this assumption.When the low-type charity
produces a valuable good, i.e., 0,v ,v , there still exists fully revealing equilibria where both LG
charities are using an announcement strategy (see Section 3.5 for a discussion).
16This is common knowledge, hence it is not possible that the fundraiser can solicit announcement
level contributions from anyone other than A. In Section 4, we argue that this is a more reasonable
assumption in a model with heterogeneous agents. The reason is that in this case the high-type
fundraiser has an optimal solicitation ordering. Hence, all subsequent contributors will use the size of
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prior to the announcement. Having observed this initial contribution, B donates to
the public good, and ﬁnally without knowing B’s contribution, A is given an
option to increase her initial contribution.
In summary the structure of the game is as follows:
1. Nature selects i 5L or H.
2. Fundraiser observes i, and selects z [h0, 1j. i
3. A and B observe z.
4. A chooses I (z) [h0, 1j;i fI (z)51, A pays c and observes s [hL, Hj. AA
5. If z 50, A chooses donation g (z 50, t )[[0, m 2I ?c], simultaneously with AA A
B’s choice of g (z 50)[[0, m]. B
00 6. If z 51, A chooses donation g (z 51, t )[[0, m 2I ?c]. B observes g and AA A A
10 1 chose g (z 51, g )[[0, m], simultaneously with A’s choice of g (1, t )[[0, BA A A
0 m 2I ?c 2g (1, t )]. AA A
If contributors knew the charity’s type then no donations would be made to a
low-type charity, and a positive contribution would be made to the high-type
charity. Therefore there does not exist an equilibrium where the fundraiser’s
announcement choice reveals that a charity is of high type. The reason is that the
17 low-type fundraiser will mimic any action that generates high-type donations.
To determine the equilibria of this game we ﬁrst need to ﬁnd the contributions
that result when the ﬁrst contribution is not announced and when it is announced.
The relevant contribution levels are determined in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. Examining
the announcement scenario in Section 3.3 reveals that there exist initial contribu-
18 tions which fully reveal the initial contributor’s type.
Given the contribution levels, the fundraiser’s optimal strategy can be de-
termined, and equilibria that constitute sequentially rational strategies and con-
sistent beliefs can be found. Section 3.4 derives the set of equilibria and
demonstrates that there exist three types of perfect Bayesian equilibria.
The ﬁrst type arises when the cost of information is so high that no information
is purchased. In this case the fundraiser, independent of type, is indifferent
between announcing and not announcing the ﬁrst contribution, and a pooling
equilibrium arises.
The second type of equilibria arises when the information cost is sufﬁciently
low. Contributor A buys information when an announcement strategy is used, and
17Consider for example the case where the high-type fundraiser uses announcements, and the low
type does not. This case cannot be sustained as an equilibrium because when contributors, consistent
with this proposed equilibrium, believe that only high types announce, then the low type when using
announcements will be perceived as being of high type. Thus the low type has an incentive to deviate
and use announcements. Similarly there is no equilibrium where the low-type fundraiser always
announces contributions and the high type does not.
18When beliefs off the equilibrium path are required to satisfy the intuitive criterion the individual’s
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she makes the value of the public good common knowledge through a large initial
contribution. Thus, a high-type fundraiser strictly prefers announcing the ﬁrst
contribution, while a low-type fundraiser is indifferent between announcing and
not announcing the ﬁrst contribution. These equilibria are semi-separating, and
since both fundraiser types use announcements we refer to them as announcement
equilibria.
A third type of equilibria is sustainable for a range of even smaller information
costs. Here contributor A buys information when no announcement is made.
Interestingly, contributor B free-rides off A’s information and does not contribute
to the public good. Opposite of the announcement equilibria both types of
fundraiser choose not to announce, and only the low type chooses to announce
contributions. We refer to this type of equilibria as no-announcement equilibria.
The paper pays particular attention to the announcement equilibria. First,
announcement equilibria are supported for the same and even larger costs than that
of the no-announcement equilibria, and they result in larger contributions to the
high-type charity. Thus we argue that announcement equilibria are the more likely
of the two types. Second, announcement equilibria are interesting because the
high-type charity, by using announcements, will receive contribution levels that
exceed those of the perfect information environment. The explanation is that if the
ﬁrst contributor wants to signal when the charity is of high quality then she must
make a donation large enough that an uninformed ﬁrst contributor does not want to
mimic the donation, even when doing so falsely would convince future con-
19 tributors that the charity is of high quality. To separate herself from the
uninformed type, an initial contributor who knows the charity is of high quality
will therefore make a contribution which may be substantially larger than the
contribution level she would have made had the quality of the charity been
20 common knowledge. This increase in contributions decreases the donation of the
second contributor, however since the crowding out is incomplete the resulting
contribution level exceeds that of a perfect information environment.
The next sections demonstrate the existence of the three types of equilibria.
Characteristic of them is that a low-type fundraiser randomizes between announc-
ing and not announcing, and that the strategy of the high-type fundraiser depends
on the cost of information. For prohibitively high information cost, a high-type
fundraiser randomizes between announcing and not announcing, and for a
sufﬁciently low cost a high-type fundraiser chooses either to announce or not to
announce the ﬁrst contribution. Interestingly announcement equilibria are sup-
ported for a range of higher costs than that of the no-announcement equilibria.
19Uninformed ﬁrst contributors value the public good, and thus have an incentive to convince others
to increase contributions to the charity. In particular they have an incentive to increase their donations
so as to appear as if they know that the charity is of high type. See Section 3.3.2, Eq. (2) for the
incentive constraint.
20The contribution necessary to separate herself depends on the mixed strategy played by the
low-type fundraiser. See Fig. 1 for the exact contributions required as a function of r . 1636 L. Vesterlund / Journal of Public Economics 87 (2003) 627–657
3.2. No announcement contributions
When a fundraiser has chosen not to announce the initial contribution donors
update their beliefs that the fundraiser is of high type, r 5m(Huz 50 ) .I nt h e 0
absence of announcements, each contributor’s donation is unobserved by the other
contributor. As a result if A buys information to determine the true value of the
public good, then that signal cannot be credibly revealed to contributor B. Recall
that A’s purchasing decision implies that A can be one of three types: uninformed,
informed with a high signal, or informed with a low signal, i.e., t [hu, h, lj.With A
the cost of information being common knowledge, however, B can deduce whether
information is purchased, and thus whether A is informed or uninformed.
Let us ﬁrst determine the contributions that result when A does not purchase
information. Conditional on their posterior, r , contributors allocate their income, 0
m, between private consumption x (z 50) and contribution g (z 50) such that they jj
maximize their expected utility subject to the following constraints:
0.5 0.5 Max x 1r G j 0 H g ,x jj
s.t. g 1x 5m jj
g $0. j
If we let g (0) denote the contribution by the other donor, then j’s best 2j
22 response function is g (0)5maxh0, (r m 2g (0))/(11r )j, and the total j 0 2j 0
22 contribution to the public good is G (0, I 50)5(2mr )/(21r ) for i 5H, L. iA 00
Now examine the contributions that result when A buys information. If A
receives a low signal, then her optimal contribution is zero, g (z 50, t 5l)50. If AA
she instead receives a high signal, then her best-response function equals
g (0, h)5maxh0, (m 2c 2g (0, I 51))/2j. B takes these contribution levels into AB A
account when determining her donation. Particularly valuable to B is the fact that
A contributes g (0, h) whenever it is a high-type charity. This enables B to free A
ride off A’s information and her maximization problem is
0.5 0.5 Max x 1r g (0,h)1g sd B 0 AB g ,x BB
s.t. g 1x 5m BB
g $0. B
22 Hence, g (0, I 51)5maxh0, (r m 2g (0, h))/(1 1r )j. This implies that B BA 0 A 0
makes no donation when the posterior is sufﬁciently small, and makes a positive
]]]]
donation when it is sufﬁciently large. When r # (m 2c)/(2m), then G (0)5 œ 0 H ]]]] 21 g (0, h), and G (0)50. If r . (m 2c)/(2m), then G (0)5g (0), and œ AL 0 LB
G (0)5g (0, h)1g (0). While the contribution to the charity is independent of HA B
21Using the expression for g (0, h) and assuming a positive contribution level we see that A ]]] 22 g (0, I 51)5((2r 21)m 1c)/(112r ), i.e., B makes no contribution when r # (m 2c)/(2m). œ BA 00 0L. Vesterlund / Journal of Public Economics 87 (2003) 627–657 637
type when no information is purchased, a high-type charity receives a larger
contribution when information is purchased.
22 Given these contribution levels A purchases information if
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 m 2g 0, u 1r G (0,I 50) ,r (m 2c 2g (0,h)) 1G (0,I 51) fg sd sd A 0 HA 0 AH A
0.5 1(12r )(m 2c) . (1) 0
To predict the contributions and information purchasing decision, we need to
know the cost of information and the consistent posterior of the no-announcement
strategy.
3.3. Announcement contributions
Next we examine the contributions that arise when the ﬁrst contribution is
announced. We ﬁrst provide an overview of how contributions are derived, and
subsequently we determine the actual contributions.
Knowing that the fundraiser has chosen this strategy, the donors update their
beliefs that the fundraiser represents a high-type project. Denote this posterior
r 5m(Huz 51). Recall that when announcements are made the structure of the 1
game is as follows: contributor A decides whether to purchase information.
0 Conditional on her type A chooses a contribution g (z 51, t ) which is AA
0 announced. Having observed g , B updates her belief about A’s type and A
23 consequentially the value of the public good. B then makes her contribution,
10 g (1, g ), simultaneously with a potential additional contribution from the ﬁrst BA
1 mover, g (1, t ). AA
The crucial difference from the no-announcement case is that B may use A’s
initial contribution to infer whether A is uninformed or informed with a high or a
low signal. All else equal B increases her contribution if she thinks it is more
likely that the charity is of high quality. When A is informed with the low signal,
she knows that the charity is worthless, and independent of B’s response she
24 makes no contribution to the public good. If A is informed that it is a
high-quality charity she has no incentive to pretend otherwise. What complicates
B’s ability to infer A’s type is the fact that A’s purchasing decision is unobserved,
and if possible A may prefer to not purchase information, yet making a
contribution that leads B to believe that A bought information and received a high
signal. Common for both the uninformed and the type-h contributor is that they
prefer that B makes the largest contribution possible, thus both will attempt to
convince B that it is a high-quality charity. The question of interest is whether
22See Appendix B for the speciﬁc conditions.
23 0 hu 0 h 0 l B’s prior is m (Hug )5m 1rm, where m (t 5hug )5m , m (t 5lug )5m , BA B 1 BB A A B B A A B
0 uh l u m (t 5uug )5m , and m 1m 1m 51. B A A B BBB
24In Section 3.5 we discuss the case where the low-type public good is of value, i.e., v .0. L638 L. Vesterlund / Journal of Public Economics 87 (2003) 627–657
there is a sufﬁciently large initial contribution that the type-h contributor can make
to separate herself from the uninformed type. The answer is yes. While it is costly
for the donors to increase their contributions beyond their best response level, the
marginal cost of a particular contribution is always larger for the uninformed type
than it is for the type-h contributor. The reason is that the public good is worth
relatively more to the type-h contributor than it is to the uninformed type, and thus
25 the marginal cost of increasing her contribution is larger for the uninformed. This
implies that the type-h contributor is willing to make an initial contribution which
exceeds the maximum contribution that an uninformed type is willing to make to
convince B that she is a type-h contributor.
For a particular contribution proﬁle to be an equilibrium of this game, B’s
beliefs must be consistent with A’s strategy. Unfortunately this imposes no
restrictions on beliefs off the equilibrium path, and as a result there will generally
be multiple equilibria: some where B cannot distinguish the uninformed and the
type-h contributor and others where the two types are separated by their initial
contributions. Riley (1979) argues that the most reasonable of these equilibria is
one where conditional on types being revealed the uninformed type chooses a
donation that maximizes her utility, and the type-h contributor chooses a donation
that maximizes her utility subject to the constraint that the uninformed type has no
incentive to mimic her choice. Thus the so-called Riley outcome is the separating
equilibrium which in the standard signaling model has the least amount of
inefﬁcient signaling. Cho and Kreps (1987) show that when there are only two
types, the Riley outcome is the unique equilibrium which satisfy the intuitive
criterion. The intuitive criterion imposes restrictions on B’s off-the-equilibrium-
path beliefs, in particular it requires that the probability of deviation is allocated
only to types that have an incentive to deviate. When B is trying to determine if a
contribution is made by an uninformed or a type-h contributor, B should believe
that deviations are made only by the type that beneﬁts from deviating. Thus if
independent of B’s beliefs the uninformed type prefers her fully revealing
equilibrium contribution to donating above a certain level, then B should attach
zero probability to donations above this level being made by the uninformed type.
Applying the intuitive criterion to the contribution game that follows announce-
ments therefore reduces the set of equilibrium contribution proﬁles to that of the
Riley outcome. Next we determine these contributions, that is we determine the
contributions of a fully revealing equilibrium where the set of strategies and
beliefs are such that the ﬁrst contribution reveals whether the ﬁrst contributor
bought information, and if she bought information, the true value of the public
25This is the standard single crossing argument, i.e., the indifference curve of an uninformed type is
steeper than that of a type-h contributor. The only problem in showing that the single crossing property
holds is that the uninformed type does not purchase information and thus has more resources available.
Fortunately, as shown in Appendix A, the single crossing property holds as long as A is willing to
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good. At any stage of the game, strategies are optimal given the beliefs, and the
beliefs are obtained from equilibrium strategies and observed actions using Bayes’
rule.
3.3.1. Uninformed ﬁrst contributor
Let us start by determining the contributions that result when the ﬁrst
contributor is uninformed and is recognized as such. First A makes a contribution
00 g 5g (1, u).0, which is announced and observed by B who correctly infers AA
0 that A is uninformed, i.e., her consistent belief is m (Hug )5r . The corre- BA1
10 21 0 sponding best-response function of B is g (1, g )5(r m 2g (1, u)2g (1, BA 1 AA
2 u))/(1 1r ). Characteristic of the Riley outcome is that the uninformed type 1
selects the contribution that maximizes her utility. Thus, A’s optimal contribution
1 following the initial announcement is g , where A
0.5 0.5 Max x 1r G A 1 H
1 g ,x AA
01 s.t. g 1g 1x 5m AA A
1 g $0. A
12 2 Contributor A’s best-response function is g (1, u)5(r m 2(11r ) A 11
01 0 2 g (1, u)2g (1, g ))/(1 1r ). Simultaneously solving the two best-response AB A 1
10 2 2 1 0 2 functions reveals that g (1, g )5(r m)/(21r ), and g (1)5(2g (1)1r m)/ BA 11 AA 1
2 1 (21r ). While it is possible to determine A’s overall contribution, g (1, u)1 1 A
02 2 0 1 g (1, u)5(r m)/(21r ), it is not possible to identify g (1, u) and g (1, u) A 11 AA
01 0 separately. Let g (1, t )5g (1, t )1g (1, t ). Note however that g (1) does AA AA AA A
affect B’s posterior, which implies that it may be in A’s best interest to give
everything prior to the announcement and nothing after the announcement.
2 When no information is bought the resulting contributions are g (1, u)5(r m)/ A 1
20 0 2 2 (21r ), and a consistent belief is m (Hug )5r , for g [(0, (r m)/(21r )]. 1 BA1 A 11
10 2 2 Given these beliefs, B’s contribution is g (1, g )5(r m)/(21r ). BA 11
3.3.2. Informed ﬁrst contributor
Next we determine the contributions that result when the ﬁrst contributor buys
information about the value of the public good. If A buys information and receives
a low signal then no contribution is made to the public good, and B’s consistent
01 0 belief and contribution are, m (Hug 50)50 and g (1, g 50)50, respectively. BA BA
In the case where A receives a high signal, she contributes an amount that is
sufﬁciently large to distinguish herself from an uninformed contributor. In
0 particular the initial contribution, g (1, h), needs to be large enough that an agent A
22 who does not buy information prefers contributing g (1, u)5(r m)/(21r ) A 11
rather than mimicking and pretending to be someone who bought information and
received a high signal. If B believes that the charity is high type, her best response
10 is g (g )5(m 2g (1, h))/2, and the overall contribution to the public good is BA A640 L. Vesterlund / Journal of Public Economics 87 (2003) 627–657
0 G (1)5(m 1g (1, h))/2. Hence, g (1, h) must be set such that the following HA A
26 constraint is satisﬁed:
20 . 5 0 0 . 5 0.5 2r mm 1g (1,h) 2m 1 A 00 . 5 SD ]] ]] ]]]] 1r $ m 2g (1,h) 1r . sd SD 21 2 A 1 SD 2 21r 21r 11
(2)
0 In a separating equilibrium with an equilibrium contribution of, g (1, h), A
00 H 0 consistent beliefs are m (t 5hug 5g (1, h)) 51. Let g 5g (1, h) be the BA A A A
contribution that results from letting (2) exactly bind, i.e., it is type-h contribution
suggested by Riley (1979).
Note, that this contribution level can only be sustained as a separating
equilibrium if a ﬁrst-mover who receives a high signal has no incentive to mimic
an uninformed contributor. Contrary to most signaling games the mimicker is not
constrained to choosing a contribution which is identical to that of the uninformed
donor. The reason is that only A’s ﬁrst contribution serves as a signal. If B
10 2 2 believes that A is uninformed then g (g )5(r m)/(21r ), and it can be shown BA 11
that the mimicking type-h ﬁrst-mover will make an additional donation
10 2 2 g (1, h)52g (1, h)1(2m 2(21r )c)/(412r ) after the announcement. AA 11
Thus, type-h’s indifference curve when pretending to be uninformed reaches its
22 2 2 minimum at (g , g )5((2m 2(21r )c)/(412r ), (r m)/(21r )). For a AB 11 1 1
separating equilibrium to exist this indifference curve must lie below that of a
type-h contributor who reveals that the charity is of high type, speciﬁcally the
0 equilibrium contribution g (1, h) must satisfy the condition A
01 0 . 5 m 1g (1,h)1g (1,h) AA 01 0 . 5 SD ]]]]]]] m 2c 2g (1,h)2g (1,h) 1 sd AA 2
20 . 5 2(m 2c)1r (2m 2c) 1 ]]]]]]] $2 . (3) SD 2 2(21r ) 1
The question is whether there exist contributions which satisfy (2) and not (3).
02 2 Clearly if the solution to (2) is such that g (1, h)#(2m 2(21r )c)/(412r ), A 11
then (3) is satisﬁed as well. The reason is that in this case the type-h contributor
can by making a smaller donation reveal her type and cause B to increase her
donation. If we can show that the indifference curve of the uninformed and a
type-h contributor satisfy the single crossing property, then the same result holds
02 2 when g (1, h).(2m 2(21r )c)/(412r ). The reason is that in this case any A 11
separating contribution along the uninformed’s indifference curve will lie strictly
above the indifference curve for the type-h contributor pretending to be un-
informed. Fortunately, as demonstrated in Appendix A we can show that if the
26Note that in trying to mimic someone with a high signal, the uninformed agent is willing to set
1 g (1, u)50 and contribute everything in the ﬁrst period. AL. Vesterlund / Journal of Public Economics 87 (2003) 627–657 641
single-crossing property does not hold then contributor A has no incentive to buy
information, that is, the single crossing property holds whenever it is relevant for B
27 to determine whether A is an uninformed or a type-h contributor. Thus we know
that any contribution satisfying (2) also satisﬁes (3).
Finally, the question that remains is whether, given these constraints, the ﬁrst
contributor has an incentive to buy information. Contributor A will purchase
information if and only if
20 . 5 0.5 0.5 2r mm 1g (1,h) 2m 1 A 0.5 ]] ]] FS ]]]]DG 1r #r m 2c 2g (1,h) 1 sd SD 21 21 A SD 2 21r 21r 11
0.5 1(12r )(m 2c) . (4) 1
As is common in signaling models, there generally exist a continuum of
0 contributions g (1, h) that satisfy Eq. (2). However, as argued earlier, this set of A
contributions is reduced to the Riley outcome when we require that beliefs off the
equilibrium path satisfy the intuitive criterion. Speciﬁcally, since an uninformed
H contributor has no incentive to contribute more than g , the second contributor
should attach zero probability to observing an uninformed contributor giving more
H 0 H than g , that is m (Hug $g )51. Likewise, the second contributor believes that BA
0 H any donation g [(0, g ) is made by an uninformed contributor, i.e., m (Hu0, A B
0 HH g ,g )5r . These beliefs imply that if g .(m 22c)/3, then a separating A 1
equilibrium exists if the ﬁrst contributor is willing to purchase information when
0 H 11 HH she contributes g (1, h)5g and g (1, h)50, resulting in g (1, g )5(m 2g )/ AA B
HH H H 28 2 and G 5(m 1g )/2. Similarly for g #(m 22c)/3 where G 5(2m 2c)/3.
3.4. Equilibria
Using the optimal contributions developed in the previous two sections, this
section determines the types of equilibria that arise in the examined game. The
fundraiser’s payoffs that result from announcing or not announcing the ﬁrst
contribution are summarized in Table 1.
Note that the only way in which the fundraiser can affect the contributors’
choice is through the choice of z. Since I (z)[h0, 1j there are four potential types A
of equilibria: (1) information is never purchased, i.e., I (0)5I (1)50; (2) AA
information is purchased only when an announcement is made, i.e., I (0)51 and A
I (1)50; (3) information is purchased only when no announcement is made, i.e., A
I (0)50 and I (1)51; (4) information is purchased independent of the fundrais- AA
er’s action, i.e., I (0)5I (1)51. Given the contributions in Table 1, we will show AA
that while (4) is not an equilibrium of the game the three other types can, for
27Since B knows A’s cost, she also knows that A is uninformed.
28 H 01 0H If g #(m 22c)/3, then g (1, h)1g (1, h)5(m 22c)/3 where g (1, h)$g , and AA A
10 H g (1, g )5(m 1c)/3, such that the overall contribution is G 5(2m 2c)/3. BA642 L. Vesterlund / Journal of Public Economics 87 (2003) 627–657
Table 1
Total contributions to the fundraiser
Contribution to Contribution to
high-type charity, G low-type charity, G HL
22 2mr 2mr 11 ]] ]] z 51 I 50 A 22 21r 21r 11
2m 2c
]] I 51 $ 0 A 3
22 2mr 2mr 00 ]] ]] z 50 I 50 A 22 21r 21r 00
]] m 2cm 2c
]] ]] I 51, r # 0 A 0 œ 2m 2
22 ]] r (2m 2c) m(2r 21)1c m 2c 00 ]] ]]] ]]]] I 51, r . A 0 22 œ 2m 112r 112r 00
certain costs, be supported as equilibria of the game. Speciﬁcally, (1) results in
pooling equilibria while (2) and (3) result in hybrid equilibria. Next we show these
results.
Proposition 1. There does not exist a perfect Bayesian equilibrium where
information is purchased independent of the fundraiser’s action, i.e., [I (z 51)]? A
[I (z 50)]±1. A
Proof. A will only acquire information if the quality of the charity is not already
known. Therefore, if A always purchases information then both types of fundrais-
ers must have a positive probability of announcing and not announcing the initial
contribution. Implying that both r and r are bounded away from 0 and 1. 01
However with information always being purchased, a high-type fundraiser strictly
prefers to announce the ﬁrst contribution, and a low-type fundraiser either prefers
not to announce the ﬁrst contribution or is indifferent between announcing and not
announcing. Therefore the consistent belief must be that a fundraiser that does not
announce the ﬁrst contribution is of low type. Given this belief it is not optimal for
29 A to buy information about the public good when no announcement is made. h
29As an illustration let us consider the case where the high and low-type charity play identically
mixed strategies. This implies that independent of the announcement the consistent prior is one half,
and we can show that A will choose to always purchase information if the cost c ,0.05m. This is not
an equilibrium because a high-type fundraiser in this environment will choose to always announce past
contributions. When an announcement is made total contributions to the high-type charity equals 0.7m,
and when no announcement is made total contributions equal (m 2c)/2. Given the high-type
fundraiser’s incentive to announce, only low-type fundraisers will choose not to announce, and thus it
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Taking account of Proposition 1 we are left with three potential types of
equilibria: one where, independent of the announcement decision, no information
is purchased, and two others where information is bought only when the ﬁrst
contribution either is or is not announced.
3.4.1. Equilibria I: no information is purchased
Let us begin by demonstrating the existence of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
where no information is bought in either the announcement or the no-announce-
ment game. In this no-information case both fundraisers receive the same
22 contributions: G (z)5G (z)5(2r m)/(21r ), where z 50, 1. If r .r then HL z z 01
both fundraiser types choose the no-announcement game and the consistent belief
is r 50.5. Since z 51 is off the equilibrium path, perfect Bayesian equilibrium 0
imposes no restrictions on r . However, since both fundraiser types experience the 1
same loss from a deviation away from z 50, a reasonable belief off the
equilibrium path is r 50.5. Clearly for mixed strategy equilibria to exist, it must 1
be that r 5r 50.5. 01
To sustain these equilibria A must not have an incentive to purchase in-
formation. When no announcement is made and r 50.5, A will not buy 0
information when the cost c .0.05m.
Next let us determine the conditions under which information is not purchased
when the ﬁrst contribution is announced. First, we need to determine what the
0 optimal contributions are when information is bought. In particular g (1, h) must A
be set such that an uninformed contributor does not mimic someone who received
0 a high signal. To signal that it is a high-type charity, A must contribute g (1, A
HH h)$g , where g makes (2) a binding constraint. Evaluated at r 50.5 it is seen 1
HH that g 50.43m. Since g .(m 22c)/3 for all c, the incentive constraint is
0 H 1 binding, i.e., g (1, h)5g and g (1, h)50. AA
Given A’s contribution her willingness to pay for information can be de-
termined. Denote the threshold cost c such that a contributor in the announce- z51
ment game buys information if the cost c ,c . Evaluated at r 50.5 and z511
H g 50.43m, condition (4) is a binding constraint at c 50.19m. Therefore, if the z51
cost of information is higher than 0.19m, then A will not buy information when
z 51.
In summary, if c $0.19m no information is purchased and the two donors each
22 contribute (r m)/(21r ). Given consistent beliefs of r 5r 50.5 the best zz 01
response by the fundraiser is to announce with probability g and not to announce
with probability 12g, where g [[0, 1]. Note that these are pooling equilibria
since, independent of type, the fundraiser plays the same strategy. See Appendix B
for a complete description of the equilibrium.
3.4.2. Equilibria II: announcement equilibria
Next we show that the existence of announcement equilibria where information
is bought when the ﬁrst contribution is announced, but not when it is not644 L. Vesterlund / Journal of Public Economics 87 (2003) 627–657
announced. Given the announcement of the ﬁrst contribution both contributors will
know when it is a low-type charity, and as a result G (z 51)50. L
If the information-purchasing strategy is sequentially rational, then it must be
that r [(0, 1), otherwise there is no reason to buy information. This requirement 1
implies that a low-type fundraiser must be willing to announce the ﬁrst contribu-
tion with some positive probability. Therefore a consistent belief must be r 50, 0
such that G (z 50)50. This in turn requires that sequentially rational strategies L
for the fundraisers are z 51 with probability 1, z 51 with probability g, and HL
z 50 with probability 12g, where g [(0, 1], generating consistent beliefs L
r 50 and r 51/(11g)[[0.5, 1). 01
Given this set of beliefs the uninformed’s incentive constraint (2) is always
0 binding. Hence, g (1, h)5y(r )m, where y(r ) must satisfy A 11
20 . 5 0.5 0.5 2r m 2mm 1ym 1 0.5 ]] ]] ]]] SD 1r 5 m 2ym 1r . sd SD 21 2 1 SD 2 21r 21r 11
Fig. 1 illustrates the solution y(r ). Note that an increase in the posterior r on 11
one hand makes the uninformed contributor care more about the public good and
gives her a larger incentive to mimic a type-h contributor, hence y increases. On
the other hand an increase in r improves the uninformed’s utility of telling the 1
truth, and thus she has less of an incentive to mimic a type-h contributor, i.e., the
separating y(r ) decreases. Depending on which of these factors dominate, y(r ) 1 1
may either increase or decrease with r . Clearly as r approaches 1, A’s 11
Fig. 1. A’s contribution to the high quality charity, y(r ). 1L. Vesterlund / Journal of Public Economics 87 (2003) 627–657 645
0 contribution y(r ) approaches m/3. Since g (1, h).(m 22c)/3 contributor A will 1 A
1 never make a contribution after the announcement, that is g (1, h)50. A
Given y(r ) we can determine the maximum cost c(z 51)5mx(r ) that 1 1
contributor A is willing to pay for information, where x(r ) is such that 1
20 . 5 0.5 0.5 2r m 2mm (11y) 1 0.5 ]] ]] ]]] FS D G 1r 5r m 12x 2y 1 ss d d SD 21 21 SD 2 21r 21r 11
0.5 1(12r ) m 12x . ss d d 1
For all c ,mx(r ), contributor A purchases information about the charity. Fig. 2 1
illustrates the contributor’s maximum willingness to pay, c(z 51)/m, conditional
on r . 1
Fig. 2. Maximum willingness to pay for information, x(r ). 1
Not surprisingly contributor A’s willingness to pay for information decreases
with the posterior r , and in particular A is not willing to pay for information 1
when she knows that the public good is of high quality.
Fig. 3 illustrates the overall contribution made to a high-type charity conditional
on r . Although there is a cost associated with determining the charity’s quality, 1
the contribution to the high-type fund is actually larger than it would be in a
perfect information case where contributors can immediately distinguish a high-
30For r $1/2 the incentive constraint is never satisﬁed when evaluated at the perfect information 1
0 contribution level (g 5m/3). A646 L. Vesterlund / Journal of Public Economics 87 (2003) 627–657
Fig. 3. Total contribution to high quality charity, G (r ). H 1
30 type charity from a low-type charity. If the contributors are able to distinguish a
high-type charity, the overall contribution is 2m/3, which is strictly less than the
equilibrium contributions just derived. See Appendix B for a complete description
of the equilibrium strategies.
3.4.3. Equilibria III: no-announcement equilibria
Finally, we show that for a range of even smaller costs we can also support
equilibria where information is bought only when there are no announcements.
Given that information is purchased when no announcement is made, a high-type
fundraiser receives a higher contribution from not announcing than does a
low-type fundraiser. In contrast both types of fundraisers receive the same
contribution when announcing the ﬁrst contribution. Hence, for both fundraisers to
be playing z 50 with positive probability, the low type must either prefer z 50o r
be indifferent between z 50 and z 51. To sustain the equilibrium the high-type
fundraiser must strictly prefer z 50, and thus the consistent belief is r 50. This 1
in turn implies that sequentially rational strategies for the fundraisers are z 50 H
with probability 1, z 50 with probability 12g, and z 51 with probability g, LL
where g [[0,1], generating consistent beliefs r 50 and r 51/(22g). Let us 10 ]]]
ﬁrst consider the case where r . (m 2c)/2m, in this case there is no positive œ 0
cost that A is willing to pay for information. Thus we cannot sustain no- ]]]
announcement equilibria when r . (m 2c)/2m. In contrast A is willing to œ 0
purchase sufﬁciently cheap information for certain posteriors when r # 0 ]]]
(m 2c)/2m. In this case B never contributes and A contributes (m 2c)/2 when œ
it is a high-type fundraiser. We can therefore determine the maximum costL. Vesterlund / Journal of Public Economics 87 (2003) 627–657 647
c(z 50)5mx(r ) that contributor A is willing to pay for information, where x(r ) 0 0
is such that
20 . 5 0.5 0.5 2r m 2mm (12x) 0 0.5 ]] ]] ]]] SD 1r 52r 1(12r ) m 12x . ss d d SD 20 2 0 0 SD 2 21r 21r 00
For all c ,mx(r ), contributor A purchases information about the charity. Fig. 4 0
illustrates the contributor’s maximum willingness to pay, c(z 50)/m, conditional
on r . 0
Fig. 4. Maximum willingness to pay for information, x(r ). 0
3.5. Discussion
The analysis presented here has demonstrated that when the cost of information
is prohibitively high, c $0.19m, the fundraiser, independent of type, is indifferent
between announcing and not announcing the ﬁrst contribution. In this case the
contributions to the low-type and high-type charity are G (z)52m/9, independent i
of z, and an equilibrium exists only if the two types of fundraisers play identical
strategies. Hence, for sufﬁciently high information costs pooling equilibria arise
and the contribution level is uncorrelated with the announcement strategy.
When the information cost c [(0, 0.19m) we can support announcement
equilibria. Characteristic of these hybrid equilibria is that the high-type fundraiser
always announces the ﬁrst contribution, while the low-type fundraiser mixes
between announcing and not announcing the ﬁrst contribution. Independent of her648 L. Vesterlund / Journal of Public Economics 87 (2003) 627–657
strategy, the low-type charity receives no contributions. Whereas the high-type
charity receives contributions G (z 51).2m/3. H
Finally, when the information cost c [(0, 0.05m) we can support no-announce-
ment equilibria. These too are hybrid equilibria, in that the high-type fundraiser
never announces the ﬁrst contribution, and the low-type fundraiser mixes between
announcing and not announcing the ﬁrst contribution. While the high-type charity
receives contributions of (m 2c)/2 when not announcing, the low-type charity
31 receives no contributions independent of her strategy.
Although we cannot rule out the no-announcement equilibrium, it is interesting
to note that the set of costs that sustain a no-announcement equilibrium also
sustain an announcement equilibrium. Given that the high-type fundraiser receives
larger contributions (G (z 51).2m/3) when it announces, this appears to be the H
more reasonable equilibrium strategy.
An interesting aspect of the announcement equilibria is that in signaling that the
charity is of high type, the ﬁrst contributor donates so much to the charity that the
total donation exceeds that of a perfect information scenario. Whereas the
contribution to the high-type charity is 2m/3 when information is perfect,
contributions in the imperfect information scenario depend on the mixed strategy
employed by the low-type fundraiser. However, despite the fact that resources are
spent purchasing information the overall contribution to the high-type charity
exceeds that of a perfect information environment.
Thus, for a fundraiser who represents a high-type charity, it is indeed in her best
interest to announce the ﬁrst contribution that she receives. Not only does this
announcement help reveal the true value of the public good, but it also helps
reduce the free-rider problem that arises in a perfect information scenario.
To get a simple solution to this problem we have had to make a number of
simplifying assumptions. However it is important to note that the characteristics of
the equilibria in many instances will be unaffected when these assumptions are
relaxed. For example, one may wonder whether the general results will change
when the low-type charity is producing a public good of some value, i.e.,
0,v ,v . Equilibria with similar characteristics can be sustained if we once LG
again ﬁnd that contributions to the high-type charity that result from announce-
ments exceed those of a perfect information environment. So let us consider the
contributions that result when announcements are used. Relative to the previous
analysis we now see that a contributor with a low signal will have an incentive to
mimic the behavior of the higher types. Thus we have three types of contributors
who all wish to convince B to make the largest contribution possible. In this case
the Riley outcome is the fully revealing equilibrium where the type-l contributor
selects her utility maximizing contribution, the uninformed type selects a contribu-
tion sufﬁciently large to separate her from the type-l contributor, and the type-h
contributor donates an amount large enough to separate herself from the un-
31 aa The same types of equilibria arise in the case where U 5x 1v G and a [(0, 1). jj iL. Vesterlund / Journal of Public Economics 87 (2003) 627–657 649
32 informed type. Note that once again the type-h contributor will be forced to make
a large enough contribution to separate herself from the uninformed contributor,
and thus the high-type charity will when revealed as the high type receive larger
contributions than it would receive when no announcement is made.
Another question is whether the set of equilibria changes when both contributors
can buy information? Surprisingly the set of equilibria are unaffected by this
extension. First, when the cost of information is sufﬁciently high there will still be
pooling equilibria where no information is purchased and the two fundraisers play
identically mixed strategies between announcing and not announcing past contri-
butions. Second, assuming that information is purchased prior to making a
contribution, there will not exist equilibria where the second contributor purchases
information following an announcement. Thus, we can still sustain the announce-
ment equilibria where only the ﬁrst contributor buys information. The intuition is
as follows: the second contributor only buys information if she thinks that the ﬁrst
contributor is uninformed. However, if the second contributor buys information,
the ﬁrst contributor strictly prefers to buy information, and to pretend as if she
were uninformed when it is a high-type charity. Hence, the second contributor can
deduce that the ﬁrst contributor is informed. Therefore, following an announce-
ment the second contributor never buys information, and the announcement
equilibria from Section 3.4.2. survive. For the set of costs depicted in Fig. 2, there
exists equilibria where the high-type fundraiser always announces and the low-
type fundraiser is indifferent between announcing and not announcing. Third, let ]]]
us consider the no announcement equilibria, these arise when r , (m 2c)/2m, œ 0
and resulted in the second contributor making no contribution to the charity. In this
case the second contributor is strictly better off not acquiring information, and
hence there will still exist equilibria where only one contributor is informed in the
33 no announcement case.
One might also worry that the result is sensitive to the assumption that both
contributors care equally about the public good. Fortunately this is not a very
restrictive assumption. Suppose for example that the second contributor cares less
32Since there are three type A players the intuitive criterion is not sufﬁcient to rule out the other
equilibria, however stronger belief reﬁnements will yield the Riley outcome in the case of the different
charity types all having some value (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1992).
33 aa Similarly we see all three types of equilibria being sustained for the case where U 5x 1G ,
a [(0, 1). The only difference is that for low values of a yet another type of equilibrium may arise. In
particular there will for very low cost exist equilibria where both contributors buy information when
there are no announcements. The fundraiser’s strategy is to never announce if she is high type, and she
will mix between the two if she is low type. Thus a high-type charity receives contributions of
G (z 50)5(2(m 2c))/3, while the low-type charity receives no contribution independent of its H
announcement strategy. The consistent posteriors are r 50 and r 51/(22g). Once again we see 10
that the set of costs that sustain a no-announcement equilibrium also sustain an announcement
equilibrium, and that the high-type fundraiser receives larger contributions in the announcement
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about the public good from a high-type charity and has preferences of the form
H 0.5 0.5 U 5x 1bG , where b ,1. If we limit attention to the cases where b is not BB H
too small, and A does not crowd out B’s contribution, then one ﬁnds that there
exist announcement equilibria which have the exact same characteristics as those
that result when preferences are identical. In particular we still get the result that
the contribution to the high-type charity exceeds the level that would result when
there is perfect information. The reason, once again, is that evaluated at the perfect
information contribution level the incentive constraint does not hold, hence total
contributions to the high-type charity will be larger than under perfect information.
If instead the ﬁrst contributor cares less about the public good, then the
characteristics of the equilibria remain the same, but the contributions to the
high-type charity will be smaller than when the person who cares most about the
public good is ﬁrst to give.
An assumption which is of critical importance is that the charity truthfully
reports the contribution level of the ﬁrst donor. We consider this assumption to be
reasonable. First, the contribution level is veriﬁable, and, second, we are not
familiar with cases where a charity incorrectly reported past contribution levels.
One might also wonder whether it is reasonable to assume that contributions are
announced independent of their level. Since the model is one of complete
information contributors know whether a high-type fundraiser has an incentive to
announce past contributions. Therefore subsequent contributions will only arise if
the initial donation is positive, hence it should not affect the results whether a zero
initial contribution is or is not announced.
4. Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to investigate the extent to which fundraisers
have an incentive to announce ﬁrst contributions when there is imperfect
information about the quality of the public good. It is demonstrated that for
sufﬁciently low cost of information, there exist equilibria where a high-quality
fundraiser strictly prefers to announce ﬁrst contributions. In this case announce-
ments help high-quality charities to be recognized as such, and they result in
contributions that exceed those that would result had the quality of the charity
been common knowledge. Hence, an announcement strategy, may not only help
good organizations reveal their type, but may also help the charity overcome the
free-rider problem.
An interesting extension of this paper is to allow the agents to have different
incomes or preferences. This extension is likely to make several of the current
assumptions more plausible; speciﬁcally, it will be possible to relax the assump-
tions regarding the exogenous contribution ordering and information purchasing
ability.
The reason is that contributions to the high-type charity are largest when the
ﬁrst contributor is either the wealthiest or the one who cares most for the publicL. Vesterlund / Journal of Public Economics 87 (2003) 627–657 651
good. Hence the high-type fundraiser will have an optimal solicitation strategy.
Given the strict preference by the high-type fundraiser, a low-type fundraiser will
reveal her type by not soliciting the wealthiest donor ﬁrst. Thus both the high and
the low-type fundraiser will choose to ﬁrst ask the largest potential donor, since
asking any other donor will reveal that the charity is of low type. Once the optimal
solicitation ordering is known, the donor with the largest potential gift will have an
incentive to be the ﬁrst to donate.
While a heterogeneous population will lead to an optimal solicitation ordering it
may also be of interest to determine whether it could generate a volunteer
ordering, where contributors order themselves and provide their contribution when
it is optimal. In particular it may be that contributions arise endogenously once a
potential donor has given a sufﬁciently large initial contribution to signal that she
is informed that the charity is worthwhile.
One of the interesting results of this paper is that when both contributors have
the option to buy information, the ﬁrst contributor is the only one who will do so.
That is, we have been able to endogenously derive an asymmetry between the
information held by the initial contributor and those who follow. Future work will
determine whether this asymmetry remains when individuals have private in-
formation regarding the project’s quality and the quality of this information differs
across individuals. Speciﬁcally, we will determine whether contributors with more
precise information are likely to be ﬁrst contributors.
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Appendix A
First, we show the conditions under which A will purchase information when ]]]
contributions are not announced.When r # (m 2c)/2m, contributor A purchases œ 0
information if and only if
20 . 5 0.5 0.5 2mr 2mm 2c 0 0.5 ]] ]] ]] 1r ,2rSD 1(12r )(m 2c), SD 20 2 0 0 SD 2 21r 21r 00
(A.1)652 L. Vesterlund / Journal of Public Economics 87 (2003) 627–657
]]]
and when r . (m 2c)/2m, contributor A purchases information if and only if œ 0
2 0.5 2 0.5 0.5 2mrr (2m 2c) 2m 00 0.5 ]] ]] ]]]] 1r ,2r 1(12r )(m 2c). SDS D 20 2 0 2 0 SD 21r 21r 112r 00 0
(A.2)
Second, we demonstrate that when the single crossing property does not hold,
the cost of information is so high that the ﬁrst contributor is unwilling to buy
information. That is, the second contributor knows that the ﬁrst contributor is
uninformed, and the incentive constraint becomes irrelevant.
Proposition 2. If c satisﬁes Eq. (4) then the single crossing property holds.
Proof. The utility function for an informed ﬁrst contributor who has received a
0.5 0.5 high signal is U 5(m 2c 2g ) 1(g 1g ) , and the slope of an indifference hA A B
0.5 curve is dg /dg 5 (g 1g )/(m 2c 2g ) 21. The utility function for an sd BA A B A
0.5 0.5 uninformed contributor is U 5(m 2g ) 1r (g 1g ) , and the slope of her uA 1 AB
20 . 5 indifference curve is dg /dg 5 (g 1g )/r (m 2g ) 21. The single crossing sd BA A B1 A
2 property holds if c ,(m 2g )(12r ). Note however that the ﬁrst contributor is A 1
2 unwilling to buy information when c $(m 2g )(12r ). Recall that the condition A 1
for buying information is that Eq. (4) holds, i.e.,
20 . 5 0.5 0.5 2r mm 1g 2m 1 A 0.5 ]] ]] ]] FS D G 1r #r m 2c 2g 1 sd SD 21 21 A SD 2 21r 21r 11
0.5 1(12r )(m 2c). 1
22 To signal that it is a high-type charity g .(r m)/(21r ). Evaluated at c 5(m 2 A 11
2 g )(12r ), it is seen that the right-hand side of the inequality is decreasing for A 1
22 22 g .(r m)/(21r ), thus we can evaluate the constraint at g 5(r m)/(21r ) A 11 A 11
2 and c 5(m 2g )(12r ). This reveals that the information purchasing constraint A 1
is not satisﬁed when c is so high that the single crossing property does not
hold. h
Appendix B
r 5r 50.5 01
z 51 with probabilityg z 50 with probability 12g, whereg [[0, 1] HH
z 51 with probabilityg z 50 with probability 12g, whereg [[0, 1] LLL. Vesterlund / Journal of Public Economics 87 (2003) 627–657 653
No announcement strategy
I (z 50)50i f c $0.047 A
I (z 50)51i f c ,0.047 A
g (0,l)50 A
g (0,h)5(m 2c)/2 A
22 g (0,u)5(r m)/(21r ) A 00
22 g (0,I 50)5(r m)/(21r ) BA 00
g (0,I 51)50 BA
One announcement strategy
I (z 51)50i f c $0.194m A
I (z 51)51i f c ,0.194m A
01 g (1,l)5g (1,l)50 AA
01 g (1,h)50.429m, g (1,h)50 AA
01 2 2 g (1,u)1g (1,u)5(r m)/(21r ) AA 11
0 m (t 5lug 50)51 BA A
0 m (t 5uu0,g ,0.429m)51 BA A
0 m (t 5hug $0.429m)51 BA A
0 m (Hug 50)50 BA
0 m (Hu0,g ,0.429m)5r BA 1
0 m (g $0.429m)51 BA
10 g (1, g 50)50 BA
1 0 22 22 g (1,0,g #(r m)/(21r )) 5(r m)/(21r ) BA 11 11
12 20 2 0 2 g (1, r m/(21r ),g ,0.429m)5(r m 2g )/(11r ) B 11 A 1 A 1
10 0 g (1, g $0.429m)5maxh(m 2g )/2,0j BA A
Equilibria II: Announcement equilibria
An equilibrium where A buys information when the ﬁrst contribution is
announced and not when the ﬁrst contribution is not announced is supportable for
any cost c ,x(r )m, where x(r ) is s.t. 11
20 . 5 0.5 2r 2 1 0.5 ]] ]] F 1r 5r (12x 2y(r )) SD 21 21 1 SD 21r 21r 11
0.5 11y(r ) 1 0.5 S]]]DG 11 (12r )(12x). 1 2654 L. Vesterlund / Journal of Public Economics 87 (2003) 627–657
The sequentially rational strategies and consistent beliefs are:
1
]] r 50, r 5 01 11g
z 51 with probability 1 z 50 with probability 0 HH
z 51 with probabilityg z 50 with probability 12g, whereg [(0,1] LL
No announcement strategy
I (z 50)50i f c $0 A
g (0,u)5g (0,I 50)50 AB A
One announcement strategy
I (z 51)50i f c $x(r )m A 1
I (z 51)51i f c ,x(r )m A 1
01 g (1,l)5g (1,l)50 AA
20 . 5 0.5 2r 2 1 0 ]] ]] g (1,h)5my(r ), where y(r ) is s.t. 1rSD A 11 2 1 2 SD 21r 21r 11
0.5 11y 0.5 ]] SD 5(12y) 1r1 2
1 g (1,h)50 A
2 r m 1 01 0 ]] g (1,u)1g (1,u)5 , where g (1,u).0 AA 2 A 21r 1
0 m (t 5lug 50)51 BA A
0 m (t 5uu0,g ,y(r )m)51 BA A 1
0 m (t 5hug $y(r )m)51 BA A 1
0 m (Hug 50)50 BA
0 m (Hu0,g ,y(r )m)5r BA 11
0 m (g $y(r )m)51 BA 1
10 g (1, g 50)50 BA
22 r m r m 11 10 ]] ]] g 1, 0,g #5 SD BA 22 21r 21r 11
22 0 r m r m 2g 11 A 10 ]] ]]] g 1, ,g ,y(r )m 5 SD B 2 A 12 21r 11r 11
0 m 2gA 10 HJ ]] g (1, g $y(r )m)5max , 0 BA 1 2L. Vesterlund / Journal of Public Economics 87 (2003) 627–657 655
Equilibria III: No-announcement equilibria
An equilibrium where A buys information when there are no announcements
and not when the ﬁrst contribution is not announced is supportable for any cost ]]] Œ c ,x(r )m, where for r # m 2c/2m, x(r ) satisﬁes 00 0
20 . 5 0.5 0.5 2r 12x(r ) 2 00 ]] ]] S]]]D 1r 52r SD 20 2 0 SD 2 21r 21r 00
0.5 1(12r )(12x(r )) , 00
The sequentially rational strategies and consistent beliefs are:
1
]] r 5 , r 50 01 22g
z 51 with probability 0 z 50 with probability 1 HH
z 51 with probabilityg z 50 with probability 12g, whereg [(0, 0.305] LL
No announcement strategy
I (z 50)50i f c $x(r )m A 0
I (z 50)51i f c ,x(r )m A 0
0 g (0,l)50 A
m 2c 0 ]] g (0,h)5 A 2
2 r m 1 0 ]] g (0,u)5 A 2 21r 1
2 r m 1 1 ]] g (0,I 50)5 BA 2 21r 1
1 g (0,I 51)50 BA
One announcement strategy
I (z 51)50i f c $0 A
01 g (1,u)1g (1,u)50 AA
10 g (1, g 50)50 BA656 L. Vesterlund / Journal of Public Economics 87 (2003) 627–657
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